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Development	for	Sale:	18th	Century	Spanish
Colonial	Administrators	and	Long-Run	Subnational
Disparities	in	Peru
Contemporary	regional	disparities	in	Peru	are	related	to	differences	in	governance	patterns	during
colonial	times,	with	those	provinces	that	were	highly	desirable	to	18th	century	Spanish	governors
suffering	greater	conflict,	ethnic	segregation,	and	economic	underdevelopment,	writes	Jenny
Guardado.
The	idea	that	the	colonial	experience	can	explain	current	development	patterns	across	the	world
has	inspired	a	wide	range	of	research	projects	across	the	social	sciences.	One	of	the	most	prominent	ideas	in
this	field	is	the	theory	that	Spanish,	Portuguese	and	British	colonial	institutions,	among	others,	had	an	outsized
impact	on	the	type	of	economic	path	of	their	former	territories.		Examples	of	these	include	creating	an
unfavourable	environment	for	the	protection	of	property	rights	or	putting	in	place	colonial	institutions	of	forced
labor	and	slavery,	as	documented	in	the	findings	of	recent	landmark	papers.
A	depiction	of	daily	life	in	Lima	during	the	colonial	period	(public	domain)
Yet,	these	results	demand	additional	questions	about	how	and	why	these	colonial	institutions	might	have	played
such	a	role:	were	these	institutions	detrimental	because	they	led	to	persistent	property	arrangements	and	trade
laws	which	were	inimical	to	growth	in	the	long-run?	Or,	because	these	colonial	policies	created	inter-class
resentment	and	lack	of	political	will	to	implement	development	policies?	Or	because	they	led	to	the	creation	of	an
(in)efficient	bureaucratic	class	and	weak	state	capacity?
While	these	are	all	plausible	explanations,	in	my	research	I	argue	that	we	observe	these	economic	effects	on
formerly	colonised	because	colonial	institutions	attracted	a	particular	type	of	colonial	governor-administrator	who
was	detrimental	to	economic	and	political	development.
LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: Development for Sale: 18th Century Spanish Colonial Administrators and Long-Run Subnational Disparities in
Peru
Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-05
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/07/05/development-for-sale-18th-century-spanish-colonial-administrators-and-long-run-subnational-disparities-
in-peru/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/
To	demonstrate	the	effects	of	the	type	of	colonial	governors,	I	examine	a	particular	episode	in	the	history	of
Spanish	rule	in	Peru	–	namely,	the	routine	sale	of	public	offices	to	the	highest	bidders	between	1673	and	1752.	In
these	years	the	Spanish	Crown	was	experiencing	substantial	financial	problems	due	to	its	numerous	and	costly
military	conflicts	in	Europe.	Thus,	the	Spanish	Crown	was	willing	to	allow	individuals	who	did	not	belong	to	the
royal	bureaucracy	into	positions	of	power	in	the	colonial	administration	–	provided	they	paid	appropriately.	These
sales	were	a	great	success:	between	1673	and	1752	around	83%	of	colonial	administrators	would	enter	by
purchasing	offices,	compared	to	only	17%	entering	by	royal	appointment.
Figure	1	shows	an	example	of	a	governorship	title	(left)	specifying	the	price	paid	(right),	in	this	case,	5000	pesos
–	ten	times	the	year	wage	of	a	military	captain	at	the	time	–	in	exchange	for	the	province	of	Andes	Del	Cuzco
near	the	former	Incan	capital.
Figure	1:	Governor	Title	(left)	and	Price	Paid	for	Office	(right).	(Ministerio	de	Cultura,	Archivo
General	de	Indias,	Lima,	633,	N.25	&	N.55.)
I	argue	that	looking	at	the	prices	individuals	paid	for	office	can	tell	us	something	about	the	motivations	of	colonial
officials	to	seek	positions	in	the	colonial	administration	and	about	their	expected	performance	while	holding	these
positions.	For	instance,	was	the	willingness	to	pay	driven	by	a	desire	to	help	the	Crown	in	distress?	Or	did	these
office-holders	see	it	as	a	way	to	enter	the	royal	bureaucracy	and	pursue	a	career?
A	quick	look	at	the	spatial	distribution	of	office	prices	(figure	2)	shows	large	regional	differences	in	the	prices	paid
for	different	colonial	provinces	at	the	time.	Thus	ruling	out	that	they	may	be	merely	reflecting	geographic	regions.
Prices	appear	to	be	significantly	higher	in	provinces	where	the	possibilities	to	extract	rents	from	the	indigenous
population	(a	practice	known	at	the	time	as	repartimiento)	were	greater.	This	effect	was	particularly	strong	during
years	of	European	war	in	which	the	Spanish	Crown	was	desperate	for	revenue.	This	suggests	that	during	these
wars,	the	Crown	may	not	have	been	so	discerning	about	who	purchased	office	to	govern	in	the	colonies.
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Figure	2:	Spatial	Distribution	of	Average	Provincial	Office
Prices	(1673-1752).	Map	based	on	current	districts.	Blank
areas	indicate	that	there	is	no	record	that	a	particular
district	belonged	to	an	18th	parish.
Furthermore,	this	paper	shows	that	the	wartime	jump
in	prices	is	strongly	correlated	with	a	decline	in	the
social	status	of	governors.	While	this	compositional
shift	does	not	prove	a	decline	in	quality,	other
historical	evidence	suggests	these	governors	were
indeed	“worse”	–	at	least	by	the	standards	of	the
time.	For	example,	these	newcomers	would	have
lower	levels	of	loyalty	and	fewer	social	ties	to	the
Crown,	and	thus	felt	less	pressured	to	perform
accordingly.	They	also	had	lesser	prospects	for
future	appointments	given	their	status	as	“outsiders”;
and	there	is	some	evidence	that	their	presence	is
associated	with	more	uprisings	by	the	local
population	against	colonial	governors.	Put	together,
this	variation	in	wartime	jumps	in	prices	across
Peruvian	provinces	seem	to	capture	this	decline	in
the	bureaucratic	quality	of	colonial	governors	in	the
first	half	of	the	18th	century.
The	key	question	is,	did	these	officials	impact	the
political	and	economic	trajectory	of	the	provinces
they	ruled?	The	short	answer	is	that	these	price
differences	in	war	versus	peace	are	negatively
associated	with	current	development	outcomes	in	a
number	of	ways.	For	instance,	a	greater	difference	in
prices	during	war	compared	to	peace	in	a	province	is
associated	with	lower	household	consumption
reported	by	individuals	today,	as	well	as	a	lower
share	of	households	with	indoor	sewage.
One	may	argue	that	these	are	simply	naively
reflecting	geographic	(dis)advantages	across
Peruvian	provinces,	or	preexisting	differences	in
colonial	times,	these	explanations	are	not	borne	out
in	the	data.
While	these	results	document	a	negative	impact	of	the	difference	between	prices	paid	during	war	versus	those
paid	during	peace,	it	is	important	to	know:	first,	when	did	the	gap	between	provinces	start	to	become	visible	and
second,	why	would	this	effect	of	governors	persist	over	time?		Related	to	the	first	question,	I	use	population	data
from	1780	until	2004	and	find	that	already	by	1827	(just	after	Peru’s	independence	from	Spain)	there	is	a
significant	population	gap	among	provinces	with	greater	differences	in	prices	paid	during	war	versus	peace	times
–	the	proxy	for	worse	criteria	among	colonial	governors.	As	population	can	be	used	as	a	measure	of	economic
development,	the	1827	gap	is	evidence	that	today’s	difference	in	consumption	and	public	goods	are	mostly	driven
by	activities	occurring	during	colonial	times,	and	not	afterwards.	This	clearly	limits	the	plausibility	of	other
explanations	based	on	later	events,	such	as	the	fact	that	the	returns	to	agricultural	activities	have	slowly	declined
over	time.
Yet,	the	question	now	becomes:	why	do	we	observe	such	an	economic	gap	in	1827	(or	earlier)	and	how	does	it
persist?	I	find	support	in	the	data	for	two	main	explanations.	The	first	explanation	is	the	idea	that	the	rule	by	these
“worse”	governors	was	associated	with	more	anti-governor	uprisings.	Since	violence	discourages	investment	in
physical	and	human	capital	and	reduces	the	effectiveness	of	government,	this	can	plausibly	cause	negative
economic	outcomes	over	time.
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The	second	mechanism	is	based	on	the	fact	that	the	extractive	activities	of	governors	were	clearly	targeted
against	a	particular	ethnicity:	the	indigenous	population	in	Peru.	Excessive	extraction	by	colonial	rulers	might
have	reduced	the	incentives	to	culturally	assimilate,	thus	depriving	these	communities	of	the	gains	of	trade	with
the	(richer)	majority	group.	This	initial	decision	to	not	engage	with	the	majority	group	would	likely	self-reinforce
itself	over	time,	especially	when	migration	restrictions	are	lifted	after	independence	and	individuals	are	able	to
arbitrage	differences,	leading	to	even	greater	ethnic	segregation.
Altogether,	these	results	suggest	that	the	roots	of	regional	disparities	in	Peru	can	be	linked	to	differences	in
governance	patterns	during	colonial	times:		provinces	highly	desirable	for	18th	century	Spanish	governors	have
become	places	with	more	conflict,	ethnic	segregation,	and	economic	underdevelopment	for	its	21st	century
inhabitants.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	This	article	draws	on	the	author’s	paper	Office-Selling,	Corruption,	and	Long-Term	Development	in	Peru	(2017)
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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